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Promoting adoption of management practices from the outside:  
Insights from a randomized experiment 
Abstract 
 
We conducted a Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) to explore the role of government 
information intervention on a firm’s management practices and performance. Specifically, 
we studied whether providing managers with information regarding the benefits of 
Quality Management practice (QM) can enable government to influence manager 
perception and adoption of QM, output quality, and firm performance. Our main finding 
demonstrates that the information intervention improves manager perception of QM 
benefits; this, in turn, encourages managers to adopt QM, leading to improvements in 
quality and firm performance.  
Keywords: Field experiment; RCT; Information intervention; Management practices; 






A positive link between management practices such as Operations Management (OM) and 
firm performance has received considerable attention in the literature (Sousa and Voss 2008).  
Interestingly, we still observe large differences in the ways firms adopt these practices 
(Bloom et al., 2013). Knowledge regarding why firms do not adopt basic management 
practices is as important as the benefits of good management.  Numerous firms—especially 
in emerging economies—do not employ many simple, already widespread practices, such as 
Quality Management (QM).  Why is this so, and what can be done to encourage firms to 
adopt these practices?  
 
Our study contributes to the literature by focusing on the role of government 
intervention in promoting firms to improve QM practice.  An emerging strand of literature 
has shown that improving business practices through consulting services can improve firm 
performance and growth (e.g., Bloom et al., 2013; Anderson et al., 2017; and Bruhn et al, 
2017). Management consulting, however, can be costly and, from a policy perspective, not 
easily scalable for reaching many firms. In this study, we explore an alternative solution by 
exploring the role of the government intervention. Specifically, expanding insights from 
extant studies, we take a step back and show that by simply providing information on the 
benefits of sound business practices—such as QM—the government can encourage firms to 
make a change for the better in management practices, resulting in superior performance. By 
doing so, we make an interesting contribution to the literature and provide policy-relevant 
findings. 
Focusing on the role of government intervention in promoting the adoption of QM 
practice, our study also joins and expands emerging literature that examines the link between 
external factors and a firm’s internal changes, especially in the area of sustainability.  
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Nguyen (2018) noted that governments have dedicated tremendous resources to regulatory 
policies and incentive mechanisms, to encourage firms to invest in technology such as energy 
efficiency improvements.  Dhanorka et al. (2017) showed that government intervention can 
have a significant impact on a firm’s environmental improvements – using two different 
approaches.  First, the government can force firms to change through punitive tactics. The 
second approach encourages firms to change, through supportive strategies. Likewise, Zhao 
et al. (2015) explored the impact of command-and-control regulation versus market-based 
intervention - on Chinese firm behavior and competitiveness. The authors noted that both 
approaches promote change in the firm’s behavior towards green development, and enhance 
the firm’s competitiveness.  
Another contribution of this study is to address a practical operations management 
question. Ketokivi and Schroeder (2004) noted that identifying drivers of firm performance 
has always been an important question in operations management research. However, 
researchers face a significant challenge in exploring the causal relationship between 
management practices and firm performance.  In cross-sectional studies, for example, 
endogeneity from omitted variables can confound the researcher’s ability to quantify the 
effect of QM practice on firm performance.  Likewise, reverse causality concerns can 
preclude directional conclusions about the impact of information.  For example, does better 
performance offer firms more opportunity and resources to collect relevant information, or, 
conversely, does better information improve firm performance?  
To address the above challenges, we conducted a Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) 
with 328 small firms. We first administered a survey to firm managers to elicit their 
perceptions about the benefits of adopting QM. Next, we randomly assigned firms into 
control, placebo, and treatment groups. The main difference between these groups is that only 
managers in the treatment group received information about QM benefits. Finally, to 
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evaluate the impact of the information provision both in the short term and long term, we 
collected end-line data on the managers’ perceptions and firm’s outcomes after 12 months 
and 24 months of the experiment.  
The main results can be summarized as follows. We find a considerable variation in 
managers’ perceptions of QM benefits. Providing information/statistics significantly de-
creased the managers’ misconceptions about QM benefits.  This result suggests that part of 
the dispersion in perceived benefits came from the managers’ lack of information/statistics. 
Regarding the effect of the intervention, we notice that managers who received the 
information updated their perceptions about QM benefits. Once this was done, they were 
more likely to adopt QM; this behavioral change led to improved firm performance. Finally, 
it is worth noting that the intervention took effect not only after the first year of the 
experiment but also continued in the following year. 
 
RELATED LITERATURE  
The link between manager perception and strategic decision-making has attracted much 
attention in the literature (Gary and Wood, 2011; Helfat and Peteraf, 2015).  For example, 
Gibbons and Henderson (2011, 2013) suggest that GM’s lower performance in quality of 
output compared to competitors may be related to the manager’s misperception—or the 
inability to recognize that the world is changing.  Studies by Rosenbloom (2000), Taylor and 
Helfat, (2009), Tripsas and Gavetti (2000), and Helfat et al., (2007) also note that manager 
perception played a significant role in supporting a firm’s transition to a new business model. 
More related to our paper, Sadun et al. (2017) observed that poor management practices 




Given the role of managers’ perception in corporate decision-making, it would be 
interesting to explore the following related questions: 1. Do managers have a correct 
belief/perception regarding benefits of sound practice such as QM? 2. Does providing 
managers with information about the benefits of QM promote change in the adoption of 
QM—resulting in changes in firm performance? To address these questions, we conduct an 
RCT to explore the role of government’s information intervention. In doing so, we join the 
emerging literature on the role of information in firm decision-making (Haas et al., 2015; De 
Dreu et al., 2008).  Focusing on a cost-effective intervention such as information provision, 
we also expand the existing literature, which examines interventions via which governments 
can promote firms to adopt internal changes (Dhanorka et al. 2017; Nguyen 2008; and Zhao 
et al. 2015). 1 
Before moving on, it is worth noting that it is possible for an information intervention 
to have no effect, for at least the following reasons: a. it fails to change the managers’ beliefs, 
b. their beliefs do not change enough to induce an adjustment in their behavior, or c. those 
beliefs are irrelevant to the decision-making process.  In this study, we expect that the 
government’s information intervention induces a change in a manager’s perception of QM 
benefit. Such change leads to change in the firm’s adoption of QM practice. Finally, we 




1 An alternative approach is to explore whether the information intervention that relies on 
specific quantitative data vs. big picture, grand, qualitative data would yield similar outcomes. 
Would the information intervention that is introduced by "government" officials (authority 
figure) vs. non-government or private personnel vs. no-personal-contact/mail delivery yield 
similar outcomes? Also, if the institutional theory is used as the theoretical foundation, then 
the information presented to firms would be somewhat different and the focus may be geared 




Our study focuses on textile firms in Vietnam. Goto (2012) noted that though most of these 
firms are small and medium-sized (SME), they play an important role in national 
socioeconomic development. The export value of textile and garment products in recent years 
has ranked number two among the contributors to the country’s total export revenue (Goto, 
2012).  Yet, most textile firms have low productivity, which may be attributed to inadequate 
management practices (Nadvi and Thoburn, 2004; Goto, 2012). Along this line, it is a matter 
of natural interest to explore factors driving management practices among textile firms—and 
whether implementing a cost-effective intervention would encourage these firms to adopt 
QM, leading to improvement in productivity and performance. 
It is worth noting that managers of these textile firms do not have much 
information/statistics about the benefits of basic management practices, although they are 
aware of these practices.2 According to the Vietnam Small and Medium Enterprise Survey 
2010 (VSME), many managers (84%) found it hard to estimate—or misperceived—the 
benefits of adopting certain basic management practices such as QM. This suggests that 
managers lack information/statistics about the benefits of adopting QM. This information gap 




2 Although Vietnam is an emerging country, it has access to QC practices from the rest of the 
world. Currently, the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) organizes training and 
serves as a resource center to develop quality practices further. In addition, the presence of 
many multinational companies in Vietnam increases awareness of quality practices, implying 
that QC knowledge is widely available. 
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The role of government in promoting SMEs  
Vietnam has long recognized the crucial role that SMEs play in the national economy. 
The government has established numerous specific programs and policies to support SME 
growth: examples include financial access, human resource development, technical support, 
and trade and export promotion (Cuong et al., 2007; Hoang, 2016). Importantly, the SME 
business support centers at the provincial and national levels have organized various training 
sessions to facilitate SME businesses to run more effectively and make a greater contribution 
to national economic development. Many of these training programs are government-funded. 
For example, the Hanoi Department of Planning and Investment has recently extended 
financial support to its SME Support Center to collaborate with the Institute of Business 
Administration (FSB) in organizing a training program for 250 managers on CEO knowledge 
of the Industrial Revolution 4.0.3 
Given that the government has played an active role in promoting the growth of 
SMEs, it would be of great relevance to explore evidence-based government interventions 
that bring positive internal changes to firms.  Along this line, our study focuses on a simple 
initiative—to provide managers with information about the benefits of QM practice.  
 
STUDY DESIGN 
We proceeded with our study in the following stages.  In the first stage, we selected firms 
from the Vietnam Small and Medium Enterprise Survey 2010 (VSME) mentioned above for 
																																																								
3 Together with the program "Starting a business," the CEO training program in Hanoi is part 
of the plan to support the development of small businesses. The two programs are expected to 




inclusion in the study.4 We then conducted a baseline survey with the selected firms. In the 
second stage, we randomly assigned firms into three groups: TG0, TG1, and TG2. Firms in 
the control group TG0 neither received information, nor were part of a meeting organized by 
MPI officials.  Firms in treatment group TG1 received the information intervention. Firms in 
the placebo group TG2 participated in a placebo meeting.  Finally, in the third stage, to 
evaluate the impact of the intervention, we conducted surveys with firms in our study 12 
months later and 24 months later. Further elaboration on these stages follows. 
 
Sample selection and baseline survey 
We selected our sample of firms from the 2010 VSME survey. Most relevant for our purpose, 
the survey asked firms in the Textile, Clothing, Leather and Footwear (TCLF) sector whether 
they practiced recording quality problems by type. 5 For simplicity, we refer to this practice 
as Quality Management (QM). Another important and related variable is the Quality 
																																																								
4	The VSME survey is collaboratively conducted by the Ministry of Investment Planning 
(MPI), and the National Economics University (NEU).  The survey has a sample of 3284 
SMEs, mostly in manufacturing and textile industries. These firms are randomly selected by 
economic regions of Vietnam.  The survey consists of following modules. The first module 
focuses on firm’s management team background, the second on firm’s management practices 
and the third is about firm’s strategic decisions such as R&D investment, while the last 
module is about financial reports. 
5 The use the recording of quality problems by type as a key indicator for the presence of a 
quality management system is in line with Bloom et al., (2013). Specifically, Bloom et al., 
refer to quality control as including the following: recording quality problems by type, 




Defective Index (QDI). In line with Bloom et al. (2013), QDI is defined as a severity-
weighted average of the major types of defects.  In addition, data from the survey allows us to 
estimate firm performance.  As a validity check of the QM and QDI reported in the VSME 
survey, our research team conducted audits with random firms in our sample. Specifically, 
we observed the QM practice of these firms and counted their defects on-site. Reassuringly, 
we found consistency between the results from the audit study and those reported in the 2010 
VSME survey. 
 Our selection of firms as participants in the experiment is based on the following 
criteria.  First, managers are also the firm owners; hence, they play a key role in the firms’ 
decisions, including management practices.  Second, all firms in our sample did not adopt 
QM at the baseline—i.e., they did not practice recording quality problems by type at the time 
we conducted the baseline survey. These two criteria yielded a sample of 526 potential 
subject firms from the 2010 VSME survey. We invited all 526 firms, of which 328 firms 
agreed to participate in our study.6  
After having selected firms, we collaborated with the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment (MPI) and the National Economics University (NEU) to conduct the baseline 
survey with the 328 participating firm in December 2010 and January 2011. The aim of the 
baseline survey is to update firm’s characteristics collected from the 2010 VMSE survey, as 
well as to provide us with additional information about the characteristics of the firms, 
managers and employees.  Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of firms in our study 
from the baseline survey.  
 
																																																								
6 We also focused on small firms (with 5 to 20 employees), and excluded multinationals. All 
these firms produce fabric for the domestic market, but do not export. Geographically, we 
focused on firms in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, to reduce the travel time for our surveyors 
and research assistants. 
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---Table 1 is here--- 
Most importantly, we elicited the manager’s perception regarding the benefit of QM 
practice in the baseline survey. The elicitation procedure is detailed further below. 
  
Manager’s perception of QM practice 
To elicit the manager perception of QM benefits, we first asked the managers about their 
perceived benefits of adopting QM for a typical firm in the textile industry: 7  
“Please estimate the average Quality Defective Index (QDI) of a current textile 
firm—which is more or less of the same size as your firm—that implements 
recording quality problems by type.”  
Next, we asked managers to estimate their own firm’s QDI in a hypothetical case—i.e., in a 
case where they adopted QM:  
“Suppose that your firm adopted recording quality problem by type this year. How 
much do you think your firm’s QDI would be next year?”8 
																																																								
7	We noticed that it is not only managers’ beliefs about the relationship between QC and QDI 
that should matter for adoption decisions, but also their beliefs about the relationship between 
QC and firm performance.  In a pilot study, we elicited the manager perception regarding the 
relationship between QC and their firm financial performance. However, the data is very 
noisy – probably because the managers find it difficult to estimate the financial performance.  
Many managers told us that they had no idea how the competitors were performing in the 
market – which would influence their own firm’s sale performance. 
It is also worth recalling that “recording quality problem by type” refers to a QM practice.  
8	The difference between this question and the previous one is interesting, because it could be 
used to infer something about whether managers took the statement provided in the 





Description of the intervention  
Having completed the baseline survey, in the next stage, we collaborated with MPI 
and NEU to launch the intervention in February 2011. We first randomly assigned the 328 
firms into three groups:  control (TG0), treatment (TG1), and placebo (TG2). 9  Managers in 
treatment group TG1 received information/statistics about the benefits of adopting QM, in a 
40-minute meeting with an MPI official.  Managers in the control group TG0 were not 
exposed to any information from our experiment, nor did they participate in any such meeting. 
The placebo group TG2 had a placebo meeting, which also lasted 40 minutes. However, 
managers in the placebo group did not receive information/statistics about QM benefits. 10 
Table 1 describes group assignment of firms in accordance with our study design.  
To conduct the intervention, officials from MPI local offices—in the same districts 
where the firms in our study were located—visited selected firms in our experiment.  It is 
noteworthy that it is a common practice for government officials at the local level to have 
meetings with managers of firms in the geographical area. In these meetings, the officials and 
managers typically discuss the economic conditions, new policies and regulations. Managers 





9	The assignment was stratified by firm’s sales per employee and location, according to 
findings from the 2010 VSME survey.  
10 The placebo meetings covered topics such as economic policies and matters that are 




Content of the information intervention 
In the treatment group TG1, managers received the “statistics/information” 
intervention during a meeting with MPI officials, which lasted approximately 40 min.  In the 
meeting, MPI officials provided managers with information about the benefits of adopting 
QM.  First, the audiences learned a few simple statistics based on the 2010 VSME survey, 
focusing on small textile firms. The MPI officials then presented the QDI scores of firms 
adopting QM —as follows:11 
On an average, in 2010, textile firms adopting QM had QDI of 12% 
 
To ensure the quality and consistency of the intervention, all officials and research 
assistants in our experiment attended a half-day training on how and what information to 
deliver during the meetings with managers. The trainees were provided a set of structured 
conversation points and themes that they would discuss with managers at the meeting; as 
such, we enabled consistency across all visits.  
 
Randomization check 
An important feature of our RCT design is that it randomizes firms into different 
groups: TG0, TG1 and TG2. To check whether the groups were properly randomized, we 
explored whether any difference existed between groups at the baseline. To do so, we ran 
regressions using the baseline’s firm-specific variables—including QDI, profit level, firm age, 
manager tenure, and the manager’s years of schooling as the dependent variables. The 
independent variables were binaries indicating if the firm was assigned to TG0 or TG1 group. 
																																																								
11  The QDI score of 12% refers to the actual statistics from the 2010 VSME survey.  On an 





The reference was the placebo group TG2. If the estimated coefficient for the treatment group 
TG1 was not significant, there was no significant difference at the baseline – between firms 
in TG1 and TG2 groups.  
Table 2 represents the findings. As expected, given the randomized design of our 
study, all key firm-level specific variables are statistically indistinguishable across treatment 
group TG1, control group TG0, and placebo group TG2. For example, column 1 explores 
whether the groups had a different QDI at the baseline. The coefficients for treatment group 
TG1 and control group TG0 are insignificant with a low point estimate.  This result indicates 
that no difference exists in the QDI score between groups at the baseline. Likewise, columns 
2 to 6 show that firms in TG1 and TG2 did not exhibit any significant differences in other 
key variables at the baseline.  In addition, our test for coefficients comparison shows that the 
coefficients for TG1 and TG2 are insignificantly different. As such, firms in these two groups 
also share the same characteristics at baseline. 
---Table 2 is here--- 
 
ESTIMATION STRATEGY AND RESULTS  
In this section, we explore the distribution of the managers’ prior perceptions of the benefits 
of adopting QM. We then compare these perceptions to the actual benefit estimated from the 
2010 VSME survey.  Finally, we evaluate the effects of the information intervention on the 




Perceived Benefits of Adopting QM 
First, we define the manager’s perceived benefit of QM adoption—for his own firm and for a 
typical firm in the textile industry —as follows:  
 
 
Perceived  benefit =  
QDI  (No adopting QM ) -  Perceived  QDI  ( Adopting QM ) 
 QDI  (No adopting QM )
      (1)  
where QDI  (No adopting QM ) refers to QDI score in case of not adopting QM; 
Perceived  QDI  ( Adopting QM )  refers to manager’s perception of  QDI score in case of 
adopting QM. 
----Table 3 is here--- 
 
 Table 3 presents the statistics regarding the managers’ perceived benefits of QM.  
Column 1 explores manager-perceived benefits of QM for their own firms, whereas column 2 
presents manager’s perception of QM benefits for a typical textile firm.  Panels A and B 
report the median and standard deviation respectively. We can note a great variation in the 
managers’ perceived benefits of QM.  Panels C and D of Table 3 display the mean and 
standard deviation of perceived benefits, and the actual benefits as estimated from the 2010 
VSME survey. It is worth noting that the standard deviation in the managers’ perception of 
QM benefits is greater than the standard deviation estimated from the VSME survey.  This 
suggests that manager’s perception of QM benefits appears to have a larger variance than the 
actual benefit. Further, it is worth noting that the mean of manager-perceived QM benefits is 
significantly smaller than the benefits estimated from the VSME survey. These results 




Factors affecting manager’s perception of QM benefit 
Given that managers seem to misperceive the benefits of QM, it would be interesting to 
explore factors responsible therefor.  We refer the manager’s misperception of QM benefit as 
the difference in absolute terms — between the manager’s perception of QDI and the QDI 
observed from the 2010 VSME survey, conditional on QM adoption. Specifically, we define: 
 
 Misperception= Observed  QDI ( Adopting QM)−Perceived QDI ( Adopting QM)       (2)  
 
where Observed  QDI ( Adopting QM ) refers to average QDI score of firms adopting QM –  
estimated from the 2010 VSME survey. Perceived  QDI  ( Adopting QM ) refers to manager’s 
perception of  QDI score in case of adopting QM. 
 
Table 4 presents the determinants of manager misperception. It is worth noting that 
managers with limited training in management have lower levels of misperception 
(β = −4.57,  p < 0.06) . Likewise, managers with higher levels of education perceive the 
benefits of QM better (β = −8.28,  p < 0.008) . Given the correlation between cognition and 
education, the negative link between education and manager’s misperception of management 
practices found in this paper is in line with the Helfat and Peteraf (2015) study on the role of 
managers’ cognition in managers’ strategic choices. Interestingly, firms operating in major 
cities perceived the benefits of QM better. This could be attributed to the fact that 
information is usually more accessible in the cities than in rural areas.  Other demographic 
and firm-specific variables do not show any significant effect on manager misperception of 
QM benefits.   




Evaluating impact of information intervention 
To access the impact of the intervention, MPI officials and our research assistants 
collected information on manager perception of QM benefits, their management practices and 
profit level - one and two years after the experiment. As such, we can examine whether the 
information interventions induced managers to adopt QM practice leading to improvement in 
product quality and financial performance.  
It should be noted that we recruited our own surveyors to collect information about 
QM and QDI, rather than depend on the manager’s self-reporting. This was to avoid the 
Hawthorne effects—i.e., “they told me about quality management, so now I say I have low 
defect rates to please them.”  These surveyors were not aware of our current project. In 
addition, they were recruited independently and had no connection with the MPI. The main 
job of surveyors was to directly watch production and count defects among firms in our study. 
To do so, our surveyors randomly visited firms one day per month to observe and collect 
information. In addition, we asked the surveyors to report major changes in the production 
process during the timeframe of our experiment. Thus, we could identify whether the 
government information triggered something like a “Pygmalion effect” or self-fulfilling 
prophecy (e.g., Eden, 1993). For example, the intervention informs firms that they will 





In line with the feature of the experiments, to estimate the impact of the information 
intervention, we implemented the following econometric model specifications:12 
Yi =α + γ Informationi +φControli +δ Xi +ηYBL + ε i   
where Yi  is an outcome variable for firm i.  Specifically, Yi can be one of the following: 
adoption level of QM, QDI score or profit level per employee.13 Informationi is a binary 
variable equal to 1, if manager i receives the information treatment.  The reference variable is 
an indicator variable for firms in the  “Placebo” group.  14 We also include a binary variable 
Controli  to represent firms in the “Control” group.  Our coefficient of interest is γ , which 
gives an estimate of the comparison on the outcome variables Yi  - between the treatment 
(TG1) and placebo (TG2) groups.  
 
Xi refers to a vector of firm-specific variables including firm age, number of employees, 
manager age, manager education, and manager tenure at the current firm. 15 YBL is the value 
of outcome variable Yi  at baseline - i.e., before the experiment. We include YBL  to improve 
the explanatory power of the dependent variable, and the precision of the coefficient 
																																																								
12 Given that some of our DVs are measured in difference scores, we also considered the 
suggestion of Edwards (2001) by running polynomial regressions. The findings are consistent 
with what we report here. 
 
13 We also use other variables to proxy for firm performance. The findings are almost the 
same as are reported here. They are presented in Appendix 1.  
 
14 We use the Placebo group (TG2) rather than the Control group (TG0) as the reference 
category in the model to give a more robust estimation of the treatment effect. This is because 
the only difference between TG2 and TG1 is whether information about QM benefits is 
provided to managers.  On the other hand, the difference between TG1 and TG0 could not 
only be due to information intervention but also due to having a meeting with MPI official. 
   
15 We include covariates at the baseline is to improve precision i.e., to reduce standard errors (Athey 






Impact of the intervention on the managers’ perception regarding the benefit of QM practice  
In this section, we examine whether managers in the treatment group (TG1) updated 
their perceptions of QM benefits.  Table 5 presents the main findings.  The dependent 
variable is the manager’s misperception of QM benefits defined in equation 2 —i.e., the 
difference in absolute terms between the manager perception of the QM benefit and the 
actual benefits. Columns 1 and 2 focus on factors affecting the manager’s misperception 12 
months after the intervention. Column 1 shows that relative to the placebo group, providing 
information significantly reduced the managers’ misperception of QM benefit for their own 
firms (β = −0.28,  p < 0.008) . Likewise, column 2 shows a significant improvement in the 
manager perception of QM benefits for a typical firm in the textile industry.  Interestingly, we 
notice from columns 3 and 4 that the effect of the intervention on manager’s perception 
persists, though less significant, even after 2 years of the experiment (β = −0.19,  p < 0.1) .  
 
---Table 5 is here--- 
 
Impact of the intervention on adoption of QM practice 
This section explores whether managers in the treatment group TG1, having updated 
their perceptions of QM benefits, changed their QM practice. In addition, we examine the 
effect of the intervention on QDI scores. Table 6 presents the main findings. Column 1 in 
Panel A presents the effect of the intervention on the likelihood of adopting QM one year 
after the experiment. Compared to managers in the placebo group TG2, those in treatment 
group TG1 are 22% more likely to adopt QM —i.e., the information intervention increased 
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QM adoption by 22%. 16 This effect is both statistically and economically significant. It’s 
interesting to note that the effect of our information intervention on QM adoption is 
somewhat lower than that in Bloom et al. (2013). 17 . A stronger effect in Bloom et al.,  
(2013) could be attributed to a more intensive and expensive intervention — i.e., 
management consultants. Finally, column 2 in panel A presents the effect of the information 
intervention on QDI scores. As with QM adoption, the information intervention improved 
QDI, though the effect was significant at only the 10% level.  
We next explore whether the information intervention sustains its impacts. Panel B in 
table 6 shows the effect of the information intervention two years after the experiment.  We 
can notice that the intervention still has a significant impact on improving QM adoption and 
QDI scores. Compared with firms in the placebo group (TG2), those in the treatment group 
(TG1) were more likely to adopt QM and experience improvement in QDI scores 
(β = 0.15,  p < 0.02) —even after 2 years of the intervention. 
 
---Table 6 is here--- 
 
Impact of the intervention on firm performance 
We have shown in previous sections that information intervention encourages firms to adopt 
QM practice, which in turn plays a role in improving the product quality as measured by an 
																																																								
16	As a robustness check, we run a simple difference regression that does not control for 
baseline level. This regression gives very similar coefficients, but less precise estimation.   
17 For example, in our study, firms in the treatment group increase QM adoption by of 28% 




improvement in QDI score. This section explores whether the intervention improves firm 
financial performance, as measured by profit level.18 As in previous sections, we investigate 
both the short-term effect i.e., one year after the experiment—and the long-run effect i.e., two 
years thereafter.  
Table 7 presents the main findings. Column 1 shows that on an average, relative to 
those in the placebo group (TG2), firms in the treatment group (TG1) experienced a greater 
increase in profit (β = 5245,  p < 0.008)  one year after the experiment.  In addition, the 
positive effect of the information intervention on firm performance was sustained even after 
two years (β = 2568,  p < 0.07) .  These effects are both economically and statistically 
significant.  
---Table 7 is here--- 
Heterogeneous treatment effect  
Given the great variance in manager perception of QM benefits an interesting 
question is whether the effect of the information intervention would vary according to the 
managers’ prior perception. We expect that managers whose prior perception of QM benefit 
fell below the actual benefit derived from the VSME survey, would respond more to the 
intervention. Along this line, we are interested in the interactive term between the 
“information” intervention and the managers’ prior perception of QM benefit. Please refer to 
Appendix 2 for an elaboration of our model specification. 
																																																								
18 We also use other variables as proxy for firm performance including total sales, ROCI, and 




Table 6 shows that providing information significantly increased QM adoption by 
managers who initially underestimated the benefits of QM (β = 0.24,  p < 0.01) .19 Regarding 
firm performance, we examine whether firms with lower prior perception of QM benefit 
gained more from the intervention. Table 7 presents the main results. We observe a positive 
and significant coefficient of the interactive term between TG1 and manager’s prior 
perception. This finding suggests that managers who underestimated the benefits of QM 
enjoyed greater improvement in profit.  
 
A validity check on the impact of the information intervention  
This section explores an important question: whether the information intervention did 
in fact influence manager perception of QM benefits, and whether it actually influenced a 
manager’s actual behavior in adopting QM.  For example, a manager may change his belief 
about QM benefits simply due to a meeting with an official—even if the meeting has nothing 
to do with information about QM benefits. To address this concern, we have incorporated the 
reference variable TG2— i.e., the placebo group in which we organized a “placebo” official-
manager meeting. The “placebo” official-manager meetings were conducted in a manner 
identical to those in treatment group TG1—except that no information about the benefits of 
QM was provided.  Hence, the coefficient of TG1 – by comparing firms in TG1 and TG2 
groups  - represents the effects of the information intervention itself.  
It is worth mentioning that we also included in the model the  “pure control” group, 
TG0. Managers in this group did not come into contact with any announcement from our 
experiment or attend any meeting organized by the experiment. The coefficient of TG0 
																																																								
19	A concern in interpreting these results as Bayesian updating is that “under-estimating” 
might be correlated to other factors impacting QDI scores.  
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indicates whether any difference exists between managers in “placebo” group TG2 and 
control group TG1. If yes, then the effectiveness of the information intervention is 
questionable. This is because such difference indicates that simply having a meeting with an 
official would change the manager’s perception and behavior - even if the meeting had 
nothing to do with information about QM benefits. From tables 5, 6, and 7, we can notice that 
the coefficients for TG0 are insignificant in all model specifications. In other words, firms in 
placebo group TG2 did not experience significant change in QM practice, product quality, 
and firm performance - compared to those in control group TG0. These results suggest that a 
mere meeting with an official does not have a significant impact on the manager’s adoption 
of QM practice, QDI scores, and firm performance.  
 
The causal effect of QM practice on firm performance 
In this section, we explore a challenging question regarding the causal relationship 
between QM and firm performance. It is difficult to identify whether QM improves firm 
performance or whether firms with better performance have more resources to invest in QM 
practices. To our knowledge, Bloom et al. (2013) is the only study that addresses the causal 
link between management practices and firm performance using an experiment. In the 
context of our study, given the random assignment of firms to different groups, we can 
estimate a regression of firm performance on QM adoption using an instrumental variable 
approach. Specifically, considering that firms are randomly assigned to TG0, TG1, and TG2 
groups, we use information intervention—i.e., the binary variable indicating whether a firm is 
assigned to the treatment group (TG1)—as the instrumental variable for QM practice. 20  
																																																								




Table 8 presents the results from the second stage of the 2SLS model. 21 The main finding is 
that adoption of QM causes a significant increase in firm profits ( β = 4688,  p< 0.006 ). 
 
-----Table 8 is here--- 
 
Does the information spill over to other firms? 
 
Given the benefits of information provision —as evidenced by improvement in profits among 
firms in the treatment group—we would like to know the degree of spillover of the 
information to other firms.  To address this in a follow up survey (run from June 2013 to 
October 2013), we focused on each of the 128 firms in control group TG0 and a sample of 6 
small firms in the same districts as those in treatment group TG1.  We asked whether they 
had known anything about the project run by the Ministry of Planning and Investment.  In 
line with Bloom et al. (2013), we found a negligible level of spillover—only 5% reported 
hearing any details of the intervention and consequently implemented QM practice. As such, 
managers in the experiment seemed not to share information regarding benefit of QM 
practice with outsiders and competitors.  
 
Attrition rate 
After one year of the experiment, there were 276 firms remaining in the study sample, 
implying an attrition rate of 16%.  After 24 months post-intervention, there were 247 firms 
remaining in the study sample (11% attrition rate). Together, 81 firms dropped out of the 
initial sample (n= 328) 24 months after the intervention (n= 247). Our attrition pattern was 
comparable to other small business RCT studies (e.g., McKenzie and Woodruff, 2012). In 
addition, the attrition rates were roughly equal across the three groups TG0, TG1, and TG2.  
																																																								
21 The results of the first stage are the same as those reported in model 1 of Table 6. The F 





The question of why firms do not adopt some basic management practices despite 
their benefits is a matter of great relevance to academics and policymakers. This study 
explores the role of government intervention in promoting firms’ internal change in the 
adoption of QM practice. 22  Doing so we complement the fascinating literature on 
management practices - which focuses on two related questions: 1. why do firms not adopt 
certain basic practices and 2. what can be the approaches to improve firms’ management 
practices. Regarding the first question, a potential explanation for poor management practices 
(e.g., Bloom et al., 2013 and related findings) that has been explored is (lack of) competition. 
However, lack of knowledge/information is arguably of more direct policy relevance, and 
easier to scale up. As for the second question, extant studies (e.g., Anderson et al., 2017, and 
Bruhn et al., 2017) have noted the role of training and consultancy in improving management 
practices. These approaches, however, can be costly and, from a policy perspective, not 
easily scalable for reaching many firms.  Expanding prior studies, we take a step back and 
show that a cost-effective intervention, i.e., providing information on the benefits of sound 
business practices, can induce firms to improve management practices leading to better 
performance.  
Managerial Implications  
From a policy perspective, our study matters to managers and policymakers because it 
																																																								
22 van Knippenberg et al., (2015) highlights an insight into management research in the 
information age, where information is so abundant that it creates opportunities and challenges 
to managers at the same time. Specifically, information on the one hand can assist managers 
to make right decisions – on the other hand, too much information makes it difficult for 
managers to focus on what matters most.  In this study, we explore a related but somewhat 
different question: what kind of information should the managers pay attention to?  Further, 
could the governments play the role of being efficient knowledge provider (Hass et al., 2015) 
by providing firms with the most relevant information? To examine these questions, we focus 
the analysis on management practices. 
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shows that government can promote change in a firm’s management practices. At a broader 
level, information provision can be a cost-effective instrument to encourage managers to 
adopt sound management practices and improve product quality.  This aspect is of great value 
to firms in emerging economies, where information is rather limited and where it is costly to 
use alternative methods, such as hiring managerial consultants and/or training to improve 
management practices. 
Our study also provides insights into the diffusion of advanced practices from foreign 
multinationals (MNEs) to affiliates in the home country. While such knowledge-sharing 
plays an active role in the growth of SMEs in emerging economies, it is equally important to 
encourage SMEs to adopt those practices. We propose a mechanism to facilitate such 
adoption is that the government can provide MNEs with information about SMEs’ perception 
of management practices. MNEs, in turn, can provide government information about the 
benefits of advanced practices, especially those that have been adopted by SMEs in a closely 
related environment. Our mechanism can be incorporated into initiatives, such as the 
Business Bridge, to promote advanced management practices in emerging markets.  
 
Implications for Research 
Our study focuses on a relatively simple government intervention to promote changes 
within companies—i.e., providing information on the benefits of QM. It would be interesting 
to examine whether an alternative information intervention that relies on big picture and 
grand, qualitative data would yield similar outcomes. In addition, would an information 
intervention introduced by “government” officials (i.e., an authority figure) vs. non-
government or private personnel vs. no-personal-contact/mail delivery yield similar 
outcomes?  Future studies could also explore mechanisms underlying the effect of 
information provision. Does information provision have a positive effect because it 
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improves the manager’s perception? Or do other mechanisms such as social comparison exert 
the same effect? For example, if managers are informed that firms on an average achieve a 
QDI of 12% from QM practice, each individual firm may see that information as a social 
reference point, with corresponding motivational consequences. More broadly, the social 
comparison nudge is an interesting topic in RCT not only in OM, but also in other 
disciplines.23 Researchers have explored the role of information provision in various areas 
such as education, finance, and management; however, distinguishing the value of 
information from the social comparison effect is under-addressed and worth exploring further.  
 
Methodologically, our study appears to be the first to conduct an RCT to explore the 
effect of a governmental information intervention on the adoption of management practices. 
Using an RCT can help researchers overcome challenges to identify cause-and-effect 
relationships of important managerial phenomena. For example, to investigate the effect of 
good management practices on firm performance, Bloom et al. (2013) implemented an RCT 
by randomizing plans into different groups and conducting a “managerial consultancy” 
intervention. Likewise, conducting an RCT allows us to estimate a causal effect of QM 
practice on firm performance. Finally, implementing RCTs with a large number of firms as 
the unit of analysis is a promising direction to address important managerial questions 
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Table 1:  Random assignment of firms by group and summary statistics at baseline survey 
 




Placebo meeting group  
TG1: 128 firms 
 




 All  TG0 TG1 TG2 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
         
Panel A: Firm Variables         
QDI score  (%) 35.67 11.84 34.47 12.26 36.84 15.47 35.76 11.77 
Number of employees 5.51 2.03 4.46 2.26 5.84 2.14 5.48 2.32 
Years of employee schooling  8.16 1.15 9.12 1.18 8.08 1.22 8.11 1.27 
Profit (USD) 515,500 68,200 515,314 66,884 515776 69,672 515,219 69 
Firm’s age (years) 










Panel B: Manager Variables         
Manager Age 42.48 9.46 40.22 8.86 43.58 7.76 42.84 6.68 
Female Manager (%) 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.05 
Tenure at current firm (years) 6.6 2.11 7.2 2.24 6.26 2.47 6.48 2.28 
Manager years of schooling (years) 15.88 5.47 16.22 4.48 15.26 4.48 15.76 2.76 
Number of managers 328  128  128  72  
         
 
Table 2:  Randomization check of our design 
 
      Dependent variables     















     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TG1 = Information 0.06 1.15 1.184 557.45 1.17 1.25 
 (0.11) (2.65) (1.06) (647.76) (1.11) (1.76) 
TG0 = control  0.02 0.687 1.51 -95.55 1.22 1.16 
 (0.17) (0.77) (0.84) (110.58) (1.09) (1.84) 
Constant 0.67 0.74 1.76 684.46 2.84 2.46 
 (1.12) (0.06) (1.02) (526.05) (2.06) (2.14) 
Observations 328 328 328 328 328 328 
F-stat (joint 
significance) 1.08 1.25 1.76 2.16 2.26 1.57 
 
 
Notes: This table aims to check whether the randomization of our study design is properly 
implemented – i.e., whether significant differences exist between groups at the baseline. To 
do so, we present OLS results from regressing the baseline firm’s characteristics on different 
treatment group binary variables TG1 and TG0 using TG2 as a reference variable. 
 
Reference category: Placebo group TG2 







Table 3: Perceived and actual QDI score contingent on  adopting QM  
   
 For own firm For a typical firm in 
textile industry 
   
 (1) (2) 
 
Panel A: Median perceived benefits of adopting QM 
 0.10 0.11 
 
Panel B: Standard deviation of perceived benefits of adopting QM  
 0.11 0.16 
 
Panel C: Mean and standard deviation of perceived yearly QDI 
Adopting QM 0.22 0.20 
 (0.22) (0.35) 
Non-Adopting QM 0.18 0.18 
 (0.16) (0.27) 
 
Panel D: Mean and standard deviation of observed yearly QDI – for 
the sample of firms in TCLF sector from the 2010 SME Survey 
Non-Adopting QM 0.35  
 (0.112)  
Adopting QM 0.23  
 (0.065)  
 
Panel E: Mean and standard deviation of observed yearly QDI – for 






 (0.116)  





Notes: Perceived benefit from QM is defined in equation (1)  in the main text as follows: 
 
 
Perceived  benefit =  
QDI  (No adopting QM ) -  Perceived  QDI  ( Adopting QM ) 
 QDI  (No adopting QM )
       
 
Panel D refers to the actual statistics derived for the whole sample of firms in the Textile, Clothing, 
Leather and Footwear (TCLF) sector – from 2010 VSME survey. 
 
Panel E focuses on textile firms from the 2010 VSME survey.   On an average, textile firms which 
adopted QM had QDI of 12%. We provided this statistics to managers in the information intervention 




Table 4: Determinants of the misperception about the benefits of adopting QM 
 
    
 Coefficient Std. Error p-value 
Panel A: Firm Variables  	 	
QDI score (baseline) 2.48 (1.57) 0.26 
Number of employees -1.26 (1.12) 0.17 
Years of employee schooling  -2.24 (1.28) 0.14 
Firm’s age -2.56 (1.35) 0.11 
Whether firm is located in major 
city  
 
-4.28+ (2.56) 0.08 
Panel B: Manager Variables    
Manager Age 5.57 (3.34) 0.12 
Female Manager 0.07 (0.12) 0.46 
Manager tenure at the current firm -2.68 (1.47) 0.17 
Years of manager schooling -8.28** (3.84) 0.008 
Participated in management training -4.57+ (2.26) 0.06 
    
No of observations 328   
Adjusted R squared 0.24   
    
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the manager’s misperception of QM benefit defined in 
equation (2) in the main text as follows:  
 
 Misperception= Observed  QDI ( Adopting QM)−Perceived QDI ( Adopting QM)  
 
—i.e., the difference in absolute terms between the manager’s perception and actual QDI 
score conditional on adopting QM practice. 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
+p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01. 
 




Table 5: Information intervention reduces the manager’s misperception of  QM benefit   
 
 
 12 months after the 
experiment 
 24 months after the 
experiment 
 Self Average Self Average 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A     











Panel B     
Control TG0 -0.12 -0.15 -0.16 0.12 











 (0.56) (0.57) (0.46) (0.76) 
 









F-stat  2.26 2.47 1.65 1.12 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the misperception of QM benefit defined in equation (2) 
in the main text as follows:  
 
 Misperception= Observed  QDI ( Adopting QM)−Perceived QDI ( Adopting QM)  
 
Reference category: Placebo group TG2. All regressions include firm-specific characteristics. 
 
In all regressions, we control for the baseline level of the dependent variables, as well as   
firm-specifics including firm’s age, manager’s age,  manager’s education, and manager’s 
tenure at the current firm. 
  
A negative coefficient of the “information intervention” indicates that mangers in the 
treatment group perceive the QDI score more correctly than those in control and placebo 
groups.     
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
+p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01. 
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Table 6: Impact of information provision on QM adoption and QDI score — one and two years  
after the intervention 
 




 (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Panel A (one year after the information intervention—276 
observations) 
   
Information intervention (TG1) 0.22* 0.15*  0.28**  0.16* 
 (0.10) (0.07)  (0.12)  (0.07) 
Control  (TG0) 0.15 0.11  0.11  0.06 
	 (0.12) (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.08) 
Underestimated 0.06 0.11  0.08  0.10 
 (0.12) (0.07)  (0.11)  (0.08) 
TG1 * Underestimated 0.24** 0.17*  0.34**  0.11+ 
 









Panel B (two years after the information intervention—257 
observations) 
   
Information intervention (TG1) 0.15+ 0.11+  0.24*  0.17+ 
 (0.06) (0.05)  (0.11)  (0.08) 
Control  (TG0) 0.12 0.15  0.11  0.02 
 (0.16) (0.12)  (0.08)  (0.07) 
       
Underestimated 0.07 0.10  0.10  0.05 
 (0.05) (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.04) 












Adjusted R squared 0.25 0.18  0.25  0.27 
 
 
Notes:   QM (QDI) improvement is defined as the difference between current and previous level.  
 
“Underestimated” denotes the sub-sample of managers, whose prior perception of QM benefit  
 fell below the actual QM benefit.  
Reference category: Placebo group TG2        
  
In all regressions, we control for the baseline level of the dependent variables, as well as   
Firm-specifics including firm’s age, manager’s age,  manager’s education, and manager’s  
tenure at the current firm. 
 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
+p < 0.10, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01. 
 




Table 7: Impact of the intervention on firm’s profits—one and two years after  
 
 
 Profits  
            
   
 Panel A (one year after the information intervention—276 observations) 
   
Information intervention (TG1) 5245**  
 (1884)  
Control (TG0) 1677  
 (784)  
Underestimated 558  
	 (428)  
TG1 * Underestimated 6288**  
 (2876)  
Adjusted R squared 0.26  
Panel B (two years after the information intervention—257 observations) 
   
Information intervention (TG1) 3568+  
 (1684)  
Control  (TG0) 655  
 (476)  
   
Underestimated 558  
	 (356)  
TG1 * Underestimated 4266*  
 (1884)  
Adjusted R squared 0.22  
   
 
 
Notes:  “Underestimated” denotes the sub-sample of managers whose prior 
perception of QM benefit  fell below the actual QM benefit.  
Reference category: placebo group TG2. 
 
In all regressions, we control for the baseline level of the dependent variables, as well as   
Firm-specifics including firm’s age, manager’s age, manager’s education, and manager’s 
tenure at the current firm. 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 





Table 8:  QM adoption improves firm’s profits 
 
 Coefficient Std.Err p-value 
    
    
  Panel A (one year after the information intervention—276 
observations) 
    
Adoption of QM 4688 ** (1784) 0.006 
    
Control for baseline’s profit Yes   
    
Control for manager’s specifics Yes   
	    
Control for firm’s specifics Yes   
    
Adjusted R squared 0.42   
  
Panel B (two years after the information intervention—257 
observations) 
    
Adoption of QM 3256* (1576) 0.01 
    
Control for baseline’s profit Yes   
    
Control for manager’s specifics Yes   
	    
Control for firm’s specifics Yes   
    
Adjusted R squared 0.36   
    
    
 
Notes:  This table presents results from the second stage of the 2SLS model. We use treatment i.e., 
whether the firm is assigned to the treatment group TG1 as the instrumental variable (IV) for QM 
adoption.  
We control for the baseline level of firm’s profit, as well as firm-specifics including firm’s age, 
manager’s age, manager’s education, and manager’s tenure at the current firm. 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 






Other measures of firm performance 
 
 
 Sales Productivity Market share 
    
    
 Panel A (one year after the information intervention—276 observations)  
    
Information intervention (TG1) 11125* 0.402* 1.26+ 
 (4688) (0.19) (0.12) 
Control  (TG0) -1014 0.24 0.46 
 (776) (0.18) (0.29) 
 	   
Adjusted R squared 0.28 0.22 0.25 
 
 
Panel B (two years after the information intervention—257 observations) 
 
    
Information intervention (TG1) 9822+ 0.358* 1.12+ 
 (4228) (0.156) (0.48) 
Control  (TG0) 4511 0.159 0.62 
 (2880) (0.11) (0.45) 
    
Adjusted R squared 0.28 0.24 0.22 
    
 
Notes:    
 
Reference category: placebo group TG2. 
In all regressions, we control for the baseline level of the dependent variables, as well as   
Firm-specifics including firm’s age, manager’s age, manager’s education, and manager’s  
tenure at the current firm. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 






Heterogeneous treatment effect of the intervention 
We expect that information intervention will have a stronger effect on managers whose initial/prior 
perception about the benefits of QM fell below the estimated average benefits of adopting QM (we refer 
to this as “underestimate”). Along this line, we investigate the treatment effects of the manager’s prior 
perception. The model specification is as follows: 
(Posttest − Pr etest)i =α + γ Informationi +δ Xi +ηYBL
                                   +  λ  Underi  + χ Informationi *Underi + ε i
 
where Underi  is a binary variable indicating whether the manager’s prior perception of the QM benefit 
is lower than the statistics about the benefits of QM provided.  We are interested in the coefficients of 
the interaction terms χ . A positive χ  would imply stronger treatment effects of the information 









24 It is also interesting to explore the effect of how far below the manager’s perception, rather than just 
using a binary variable. The results are highly consistent with what we report in the main text.		 
